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ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan memaparkan upaya kandidat perempuan mematahkan praktik 
politik uang dan pengaruh dukun dalam pemilihan kepala desa (pilkades) tahun 2018. 
Peneliti menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan studi kasus pemilihan kepala Desa 
Sriharjo, Kabupaten Bantul. Peneliti mengumpulkan data primer melalui wawancara, 
diskusi kelompok mendalam dan observasi. Adapun data sekunder dikumpulkan 
melalui studi literatur, internet, foto dan video proses pilkades. Hasil penelitian ini 
menemukan adanya penggunaan politik uang dan terindikasi melalui serangan fajar 
yang dilakukan oleh ‘sniper’ yang bertugas membagi-bagikan amplop dari rumah ke 
rumah penduduk pada malam hari (H-1), Selain itu kandidat dalam meraih simpati 
memberikan bantuan sarana dan prasarana kepada masyarakat. Selaras dengan hal 
tersebut, tim sukses juga menggunakan jasa kekuatan spiritual (dukun) melalui medium 
penebaran kembang di setiap padukuhan - tujuannya agar masyarakat di pedukuhan 
tersebut tidak memilih kandidat lain. Menyikapi strategi pesaing tersebut, kandidat 
perempuan menggunakan politik hati nurani untuk memberdayakan masyarakat, 
melakukan pengawasan ketat terhadap para ‘sniper’, membangun jejaring dan 
pemutusan kekuatan spiritual.
Kata kunci: politik hati nurani, politik uang, jejaring, kekuatan spiritual 
ABSTRACT
This study aims to describe the efforts of female candidates to break the practice of 
money politics and the influence of shamans in the 2018 Sriharjo subdistrict election 
(pilkades). The author used qualitative methods with a case study of the Sriharjo village-
head election in Bantul Regency. The author collected primary data through interviews, 
in-depth group discussions, and observations. Secondary data were collected through 
a literature review, online articles, photos, and video studies of the pilkades process. 
The findings of this study show the practice of money politics carried out by “snipers,” 
whose job is to distribute envelopes containing money from house to house from night 
to dawn one day prior to election day. In addition, candidates also provide assistance 
and facilities to the community to get their votes. The success team also uses the 
services of shamans by spreading flowers in certain areas with the aim of spiritually 
binding people so as not to vote for other candidates. Responding to the competitor’s 
strategy, the female candidate employed the politics of conscience to empower the 
community, monitored the snipers of other candidates, built networks, and broke the 
spiritual powers.
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INTRODUCTION
Ideally, the election for rural subdistrict head (pilkades) reflects sub-
stantive democracy because Indonesian democracy starts at the district 
level. This idea is in line with Hatta’s (1960) belief that the roots of de-
mocracy in Indonesia lie in discussions among its people. Democracy in 
Indonesia has never been influenced by the democracy of the West, nor 
has it taken an authoritarian form. Instead, it has always been a real de-
mocracy, social democracy, upholding the values of villagers’ cultures.
The rules on how to conduct an election for subdistrict head (kepala 
desa) are stipulated in Village Law No. 6 of 2014, Articles 31–34, which 
are opposed to the cultures of villagers. It appears that the election for 
district head stipulated in this Law is inspired by liberal democracy, 
where an election is direct, free from coercion, and confidentially car-
ried out by the people as a mass. In other words, it may be described 
as “one man, one vote, and one value.” The implication of this direct 
election triggers tight competition among candidates and thus gives 
birth to money politics as a means of winning the contest.
Among villagers, most of whom are farmers, according to Scott 
(1972) the culture of patronage flourishes as it is perpetuated in a place 
with different social statuses. He defines patronage as a relation be-
tween two people of different class statuses, where the patron; a wealthy 
person, holds a higher status than the client; a farmer, for example. In 
the process of interaction between these people, the patron will give 
money, goods, or services to the client. In accordance with this, Shefter 
(1994) defines patronage as a form of material giving to an individual 
to gain personal support (Hutchcroft 2014, 176–177). However, Aspinall 
and Sukmajati (2015) hold a different perspective from Scott (1972) 
and Shefter (1994) regarding patronage and clientelism. Aspinall and 
Sukmajati (2015) believe that patronage is a form of material or goods 
giving through governmental programs.
Moreover, Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) describe the personal ex-
change of goods or services as clientelism, where a patron has a per-
sonal relation with the supporter. While patronage is institutionalized 
through governmental programs, clientelism is more personal. There-
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fore, patronage and clientelism, in which the political elite give money, 
goods, or services, are categorized as a practice of money politics. Aspi-
nall and Sukmajati (2015) categorize the practice of money politics 
into five groups: (1) vote buying, (2) individual gifts, (3) services and 
activities, (4) club goods, and (5) pork barrel projects. These categories, 
according to them, exist in the elections for district head in Indonesia.
In a political contest, candidates usually use exchange money, goods, 
and services for political support. To determine how money politics 
works and how electoral candidates employ it, this research is a case 
study of the election for subdistrict head in Sriharjo, Bantul District. 
The election in Bantul was conducted in 30 villages, on October 14, 
2018, and had 87 candidates competing for the head and deputy head 
district positions. The author chose Sriharjo Village as the corpora for 
three reasons. The first, poverty and local wisdom. Sriharjo Village 
is one of the poor areas in Bantul. Singarimbun and Penny (1976) re-
vealed that the people in this subdistrict, especially those living in the 
Dukuh Miri area, lived in poverty due to a lack of agricultural land 
and high population growth. The rapid population growth, along with 
very limited agricultural areas and job opportunities, resulted in high 
unemployment and poverty in the area. The condition has persisted 
since the 1970s. Aside from the limited agricultural land and the rapid 
population growth, the subdistrict head also engaged in practices of 
corruption. He was imprisoned for his actions, which left governmen-
tal operations in the district stagnant. This condition resulted in the 
development of public facilities in the district being stuck in the status 
quo, causing economic growth in the area to drastically decrease. Three 
years without a district head caused the area to suffer from a financial 
deficit and marginalization in the economic, education, health, and 
workplace sectors. Under these circumstances, money politics had a 
very big impact as a means of getting votes for electoral candidates. 
But the Sriharjo people have a different local wisdom with Scott and 
Aspinall’s theories. Even though they are physically poor, but they have 
a conscience that guides them in choosing candidates with integrity in 
the pilkades.
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The second reason was a strong patronage relation. The people of 
Sriharjo mostly work as agricultural farmers or livestock farmers. Gen-
erally, farmers in this area live a simple life and help each other thrive. 
People who had land for farming were among the rich, while those who 
did not own such land only worked as farmers for the rich. Farmers did 
not have enough access to buy seeds, fertilizer, and tractors, and thus 
were dependent on the landlords for a living. In this case, Scott’s (1972) 
theory of the relationship between two people of different statuses has 
proven to be true. However, although the candidate for the village head 
who has a large capital of capital handing out money and goods to the 
community, most people are aware and reject money politics.
Third, Javanese culture is the soul of the people’s daily lives. The 
people live in a strong Javanese culture wherein they still perform ritu-
als and practices from their ancestors, such as bersih desa (village cleans-
ing), childbirth rituals, death rituals, and kasekten in elections for the 
district head. All in all, people’s activities are greatly influenced by 
deep-rooted Javanese cultures and values.
Previous pilkades research was conducted by Latief (2000) and Hi-
dayat, Prasetyo, and Yuwana (2018) in Sragen and Kediri Regencies 
respectively. The findings of their research showed that the elected can-
didates asked for help from shamans (dukun), took a personal approach 
to neighbors by giving them money and goods, and held a discussion, or 
slametan. The involvement of a shaman in pilkades is often overlooked 
and not investigated. Therefore, we cannot be sure if a candidate wins 
because of electability or the shaman factor.
In line with this, the contest between candidates in an election 
requires a winning strategy, and money politics is considered an ef-
fective tool for influencing voters’ behavior. Research on pilkades in 
relation to money politics was also carried out in Pati (Fitriyah 2015), 
Nganjuk (Ratnasari and Adi 2016), Bangkalan (Ainillah 2016), Magetan 
(Harianto, Rahardjo, and Baru 2018), and Kediri (Hidayat et al. 2018). 
The research findings showed that the more money candidates gave 
to people, the greater the chance that they will get votes and thus win 
the election.
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Likewise, Hidayat et al. (2018) examined the collapse of oligarchies 
in the Tanjung Village election in Kediri District. Their findings dem-
onstrated that the power of oligarchs manifested in the form of material, 
money, and influence failed to shape voters’ behavior. This suggests that 
the hypothesis that oligarchs with great power in the form of ownership 
of capital, goods, and influence is not directly proportional to winning 
in pilkades. In other words, candidates who have economic capital, so-
ciocultural capital, and network capital will not necessarily win pilkades.
Based on the results of the research and the theory mentioned above, 
it appears that there have been few studies of the strategy of break-
ing the practice of money politics in pilkades. Aspinall and Sukmajati 
(2015) discussed the five patterns of money politics practices in Indo-
nesia, which are also reflected in pilkades. Anderson (1972) described 
the concrete power practices that candidates employ in pilkades. Scott 
(1972) emphasized patronage relations as a “lubricant” element in the 
culture of the community that candidates could employ to influence 
voters’ behavior. The present paper aims to fill in the gap in the theory 
of how candidates break the practice of money politics in pilkades.
PATRONAGE, MONEY POLITICS,  A ND SH A M A NS
Analyses of contestation in pilkades cannot be separated from the pres-
ence of village heads in the Javanese perception. The figure of the 
village head, according to the Javanese people, is the “incarnation” of 
the Almighty God, like a king. Yet, while a village head is considered 
a “little king,” their authority is still not as much and as powerful as 
that of a real king. Moedjanto (1986) believes that Javanese power is 
different from power in a democratic country, which he refers to as ke-
agungbinatharaan. According to Moedjanto, in Javanese leadership, the 
king has power throughout the country (wenang wisesa ing sanagari). 
In addition, the king from the Javanese perspective is the king himself 
because the king is the incarnation of the Divine (God). Because the 
king has unlimited power and he is a country himself, a village head 
is considered a royal servant to the king as well as a smaller part of the 
king’s power. In other words, Javanese culture perceives a village head 
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as a “little king” who has access to tanah bengkok (salary lands) and is 
required to be loyal to the king.
Village heads in the New Order era were under the control of the 
government, while in the Reform era there was quite a change, where 
village heads were directly elected by the community. The position of 
a village head who previously only implemented government policy has 
changed to that of building an independent government. In the context 
of pilkades, which upholds the value of one man, one vote, one value, 
the competition between candidates is intense. According to Husken 
(2001), who examined pilkades in Sambiroto, Pati Regency, competing 
candidates utilized patronage and money relations to win the pilkades. 
However, another finding from Husken was that incumbent families or 
capital owners did not participate in many pilkades contests because the 
position of a village head was not interesting and only gave that person 
power over crooked land, not to mention it brought with it little pay. 
Meanwhile, the amount of money needed to participate for the electoral 
process in pilkades is substantial.
In accordance with this, Scott (1972) argues that in an agrarian 
society, relations between patrons and clients really exist. According to 
Scott, patronage is defined as follows:
“The patron-client relationship—an exchange relationship between 
roles—may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two person) ties 
involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual 
of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and 
resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of 
lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance by offering general support and assistance, 
including personal services, to the patron.”
According to Scott (1972), patronage relations occur when people with 
higher economic status (patrons) provide protection or benefits to peo-
ple of lower status (clients). As a result, the client repays the patron’s 
kindness with personal support, assistance, or services. To maintain the 
relationship between patron and client, a supporting element is needed. 
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The patron usually gives goods, money, or services that are valuable to 
the client (the community). In addition to the aforementioned valu-
ables, patrons provide protection services from the threat of criminal 
activities. If the client considers the gift valuable, then he or she accepts 
the gift. With the gift received, the client then has an obligation to re-
pay the patron. The patronage relation can be employed by candidates 
in pilkades, and the exchange will provide support for the patrons.
However, turning patronage relations into support for candidates 
is not enough without the provision of money and goods. Therefore, 
Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) examined the use of patrols and the rise 
of money politics in Indonesia. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) argued 
that political elites or candidates used a campaign strategy with a pa-
tronage approach (Shefter 1994, 283; Hutchcroft 2014, 176–177). Elites 
as candidates (patrons) in the election bought votes, gave club goods, 
and engaged in pork barrel politics.
In carrying out the money politics strategy, the candidate used a 
“broker” or a “success team” that was in charge of giving money or 
goods to potential voters. Aspinall (2015, 4) defines patronage as the 
relationship between patron (candidate) and client (voter) in which vote 
buying and transactions involving money and goods occur. Aspinall’s 
view of patronage is in line with Muhtadi (2013, 3), who argues that 
patronage culture is one of the sources of the rise of money politics in 
elections. Aspinall and Sukmajati’s (2015), and Muhtadi’s (2013) as-
sumptions are based on the fact that there are still many people in 
developing countries who are illiterate, poor, and less modern. In a 
context of poverty and social inequality, candidates have a significant 
opportunity to buy the votes of people of this social status through 
money politics.
Muhtadi (2013) found that the existence of patronage relations and 
the absence of closeness with political parties led to the flourishing 
of money politics (Atia and Herrold 2018; Schirmer and Apple 2018). 
This means that the implementation of patronage relations and the 
practice of money politics are done privately. In addition, the patronage 
culture factor in Indonesia has taken root in the community. At first, 
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the patronage culture only developed among families and communities, 
without political motives. Since then, the patronage relation in Indo-
nesian society has become a rooted culture and has no other interests. 
Communities give money and goods to each other with the motive of 
helping each other without any political agenda (Tjahjoko 2016).
In the world of politics, however, the patronage relationship has 
changed into the practice of giving money and goods with an agenda to 
influence voters’ behavior. Likewise in pilkades, each candidate gathers 
votes from community members by giving money, goods, and services. 
The generally accepted assumption behind this action is that the more 
a candidate gives in money, goods, and services, the more sympathy he 
or she will receive from the people. There are even people who promise 
a number of votes if given certain items.
Contrary to the foregoing, according to Bambang (community 
leader) up to now the Sriharjo villagers have witnessed the negative 
impact of money politics, where the village head is corrupt and goes 
to prison. Village infrastructure development has stopped and villages 
have tended to lag behind in terms of infrastructure and structure de-
velopment. “Therefore, my friends and I support Ms. Titik sincerely and 
reject money politics”. (Interview with Bambang, March 27, 2019). This 
was confirmed by Suparjiyono (Chair of the Farmers Group) that he 
supported the lurah (head of urban subdivision of a district) candidate 
without money politics. “I support Mbak Titik, because I have served the 
community by building flyovers”. (Interview with Suparjiyono, March 
27, 2019). In line with this Heri Santosa (youth leader) said: “We young 
men/women support Ms. Titik with sincerity sincerely without money 
politics. We look for funds through making shirts and contributions”. 
(Interview with Heri Santosa, March 27, 2019).
In addition, because in the tradition of village people, the figure 
of a village head is described as the “little king,” kasekten, or power, is 
therefore needed in leading the village (Moedjanto 1986; Antlov and 
Cederroth 2014). This confers a sense of authority on the village head 
and symbolizes respect from the community toward that person. Ac-
cording to Anderson (1972), kasekten is concrete in form. The Javanese 
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believe that a village head is someone who receives “revelations” from 
the Almighty God. To find out who will be elected as village head, they 
usually have a tradition of “staying alert” until dawn to wait for a “fall-
ing star” coming from the sky to the village. Traditions like this have 
been believed and perpetuated for years because the people believe that 
a village head is a person who gets revelations from above. In Ander-
son’s term, power as understood in Javanese culture is concrete, taking 
the form of the appearance of falling stars, keris (a traditional weapon 
from Java), spears, and other heirlooms. Due to this belief, candidates 
in pilkades also use the services of shamans to obtain kasekten and 
influence voters’ choices.
METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted in the village of Sriharjo, Bantul Regency 
for three months (February–April 2019) after the 2018 pilkades. The 
study used a qualitative method, with a case study as the study method. 
The case study was chosen as the method of study in this research 
because it has profound advantages in explaining a topic or phenom-
enon experienced by the subjects. In addition, the case study method 
also has advantages because the disclosure or exposure is carried out 
comprehensively so as to produce relevant knowledge. In summary, re-
search with the case study method seeks to uncover the complexity of a 
problem to build a framework using primary data collection techniques, 
such as interviews, in-depth discussion groups, and observations (Stake 
2005; Creswell 2007; Yin 2009).
Primary data were collected through interviews and in-depth discus-
sion with 25 participants, consisting of people involved in pilkades as 
committee, the ex-head of the Village Assembly Agency, the families 
of candidates, and success teams. Three ways of collecting data were 
used, which are observation, interviews, and in-depth group discussions.
The first way that the author collected the data was through obser-
vations in Sriharjo Village in Bantul District. The author wandered 
around the village to get the whole picture of the daily lives of the 
people, who were mostly farmers. The author also observed the condi-
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tion of governmental buildings and people’s houses, which seemed not 
as modern as those in the surrounding districts. Public facilities in the 
village such as the health-care center, schools, and the subdistrict office 
were not well maintained. The author explained the intention of this 
research to the public officials there and presented the official permit 
from the Development Planning Agency of Bantul Regency.
Second, after observing the surrounding area, the author conducted 
interviews. Before the interviews, the author had prepared some inter-
view guidelines about the process of pilkades in Sriharjo, the candidates’ 
agenda, the candidates’ capital, the campaign strategy, the strategy to 
deal with money politics, and programs proposed by each candidate. 
After the guidelines were established, the next step was to interview 
the district head, district secretary, and other public officials. In the 
interview process, the author documented and recorded everything. 
To reduce the participants’ sense of being interrogated, the author car-
ried out the interviews in a less formal manner. The results of the 
interviews were then processed and prepared, to answer the research 
questions after a validity test aimed at comparing the answers from 
the district head and other public officials. The three respondents had 
directly witnessed the contest in the previous pilkades. This validation 
is important in qualitative research as primary data must be collected 
from the people directly involved in the case being discussed. After the 
validation process, it was found out that their answers collaborated with 
one another, rendering the data valid. The valid data then became the 
reference for formulating this research.
Last, the author held in-depth group discussions with twenty two 
participants consisting of the following: dukuh, farmer groups, success 
teams, families, youth groups, and administrators of the neighborhood 
community with the aim of deeply exploring their experiences, espe-
cially regarding the winning process and the strategy for breaking the 
practice of money politics. The author carried out in-depth group dis-
cussions over dinner with the participants. After dinner, the author 
asked questions that were answered spontaneously by the participants. 
From the participants’ answers, the author then escalated the discus-
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sions by asking about other participants’ point of view. The discussions 
seemed to flow smoothly and in a relaxed manner so that all partici-
pants related the true experience of volunteering for the winning team 
without getting paid. The author then went more deeply into the spirit 
of volunteerism with various questions related to money politics.
The results of these in-depth group discussions were then processed 
to formulate answers to the research questions. However, the data had 
to be validated so that its accuracy could be relied upon. To test the 
qualitative data, the author made a comparison between the data of the 
lurah and all discussion participants to see if the data from the lurah 
were synchronous and in harmony with the data from in-depth group 
discussions. In other words, to test the primary data from the head of 
the village, the author compared them with those of the other twenty 
two people. It turned out that the primary data matched the data from 
the results of the in-depth discussions. Thus, the data from the results 
of the in-depth discussions can be relied on for accuracy and can be 
used in formulating knowledge or scientific work.
The secondary data were collected through the study of accredited 
national and international journals published within the last five years. 
Likewise, the literature review of books was also taken from the pub-
lications that appeared within the last five years. The selection of this 
period of time was intended to keep the data and the topicality of the 
subject matter up to date, both in the national and the international 
context. The secondary data collection in the form of campaign videos, 
photos, and the Internet was intended to complement the visual data. 
Through observing videos and photographs of the Sriharjo pilkades con-
test, the author was able to get an overview of the situation at that time. 
Thus, the author was able to grasp what was experienced by candidates, 
the success team, and the Sriharjo community in pilkades.
After the primary and secondary data were collected, the author 
proceeded with three steps. The first step was to sort out the validated 
primary data to answer the research questions. Then, the primary data 
that had been tested and proven accurate were analyzed and formu-
lated to build a framework of knowledge. The validated primary data 
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were the source for answering the questions in this research. In this 
case, the author did not incorporate new thoughts or narratives into the 
data that might obscure the concept of knowledge to be constructed. 
After the primary data had been validated, the next step was to create 
a framework of thoughts that encapsulated the results of the findings 
in this study. With the existence of such a framework, researchers can 
formulate the concept of knowledge. The third step was to formulate 
the concept of knowledge. Based on the validated primary data and the 
framework of knowledge, the author then analyzed and described the 
formulation in words. The formulation of these words was the result 
of research and the validation of primary data. This research uses a 
phenomenological approach that has originality, because it focuses on 
events experienced by respondents in the Sriharjo pilkades in 2018. Ac-
cording to Creswell (2015, 105), the purpose of the phenomenological 
approach is to explore the experiences of individuals into a description 
of the essence of the conception of knowledge. In summary, the phe-
nomenological approach looks for the conceptual meaning behind what 
is experienced by the subject of the actor.
A Glimpse of Sriharjo Village
Sriharjo Village is an administrative area of Imogiri District, Bantul 
Regency, Special Region of Yogyakarta. The area of Sriharjo Village 
is 501.36 Ha, composed of rice fields, cultivation, plantation, animal 
husbandry, handicrafts, and small businesses. Sriharjo Village has thir-
teen hamlets/sub-villages: (1) Dusun Miri, (2) Jati, (3) Mojohuro, (4) 
Pelemadu, (5) Sungapan, (6) Gondosuli, (7) Trukan, (8) Dogongan, (9) 
Ketos, (10) Ngrancah, (11) Pengkol, (12) Sompok, and (13) Wunut. The 
largest area is Wunut, while the smallest is Dogongan. The composition 
of the population of Sriharjo Village is shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1. Numbers of Population in Sriharjo Village, Bantul
No. Population Total
1. Male 5,047
2. Female 5,361
3. Age of 1–15 Years Old 1,940
4. Age of 15–65 Years Old 6,897
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No. Population Total
5. 65 Years Old and above 1,267
Total 10,408 (3,020 families)
Source: Sriharjo Village Government (2018b)
Table 1.1 shows that the numbers of the female population are higher, 
with 314 more females than males. With a greater number of women 
than men, the public could understand the emergence of two female 
candidates in the Sriharjo pilkades: (1) Lily Wakhidah, S.Ag, head of 
the Sriharjo BPD (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, Village Consulta-
tive Body), and (2) Titik Istiyawatun Khasanah, S.IP. In addition, the 
population of productive age amounts to more than 50 percent (aged 
15–65 years), which indicates that the community had sufficient human 
resources to build and develop Sriharjo Village.
However, the population of the poor in Sriharjo Village was high, 
totaling 8,288 people. This condition allowed a space for money politics 
in pilkades to grow within the society because the poor were highly 
vulnerable to persuasion and money, which candidates saw as a good 
opportunity to exploit. An economic description of the Sriharjo Village 
generally is shown in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Livelihoods of People of Sriharjo Village, Bantul
No. Occupation Total
1. Civil Servant 142
2. Police/Army 56
3. Employee of a private company 957
4. Entrepreneur/Trader 834
5. Farmer 821
6. Construction Worker 353
7. Farm Worker 765
8. Retired 74
9. Breeder 280
10. Service Worker 291
11. Craftsman 38
12. Art Worker 10
13. Unemployed 575
14. Other 2,054
Source: Sriharjo Village Government (2018b)
Considering the data in Table 1.2, it seems that people who were vul-
nerable to money politics were unemployed and others, a total of 2,629 
people. If a candidate practiced money politics with the unemployed 
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group, that candidate was predicted to win, because the number of 
Permanent Voter Lists (DPT) in the Sriharjo Pilkades was 6,055 people.
The election of village head or district head of Sriharjo Village, Ban-
tul was an implementation of Law No. 6 of 2014, where the community 
directly voted for the candidates. The Sriharjo pilkades was carried out 
through the stages of nomination, voting, and vote counting to deter-
mine the winner. The Sriharjo pilkades was held on October 14, 2018, 
with three candidates: (1) Lily Wakhidah, S. Ag., (2) Titik Istiyawatun 
Khasanah, S.IP, and (3) Tusiman. After going through the stages of 
nomination, voting, and winner determination, the Sriharjo Election 
Committee announced the results, shown in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3 Results of 2018 pilkades in Sriharjo, Bantul
No. Candidates Votes
1. Lily Wakhidah, S.Ag. 519
2. Titik Istiyawatun Khasanah, S.IP 4,681
3. Tusiman 632
4. Invalid Votes 223
5. Total Voters 6,055
Source: Sriharjo Village Government (2018a) 
R ESULTS A ND DISCUSSION
This paper focuses on winning female candidates in the 2018 Sriharjo 
pilkades. In the process of the election, candidates used various efforts to 
win pilkades. Field findings show the efforts of candidates to influence 
voters through money politics and spiritual power. The giving of money 
and goods was considered effective in influencing voters’ behavior. To 
assure the voters even more, the candidates asked for help from a sha-
man to practice their spiritual power. Figure 1.1 illustrates the flow of 
money politics in pilkades.
The figure indicates the flow of money, goods, and services to the 
voters as follows. First, candidates formed a success team because they 
realized such a team was the spearhead for their victory. Therefore, the 
candidate chose people who were loyal to them and willing to help in 
the winning process. The success team could consist of family mem-
bers, community leaders, religious leaders, and young people. After 
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the success team was formed, they held regular meetings to discuss 
strategies to direct people’s choices to them. Second, the success team 
also acted as a distributor. The team immediately took concrete steps, 
such as setting up a budget to buy goods as well as allocating some of 
the money to be given to the people. After the budget was approved by 
the candidate, the success team then delegated to the field coordinators 
the task of distributing money and goods to the people living in their 
surroundings. In this case, the role of the success team was as the dis-
tributor of money and goods to the field coordinator. Third, there were 
field coordinators who acted as executors. After the field coordinators 
received money and goods from the success team, they immediately 
started to distribute the money and goods in the neighborhood com-
munity. The nickname “sniper” was given to the field coordinators by 
other candidates. Usually, these snipers worked from night until dawn, 
going door-to-door to distribute envelopes with money inside, buying 
people’s vote for IDR 50,000,- per vote. The number of envelopes given 
to each household depended on the number of eligible voters in the 
home. Let us say there were four eligible voters in a home. Then, each 
Figure 1.1. Money politics mechanism in pilkades.
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eligible voter would get an envelope with IDR 50,000,- inside. As for 
the provision of goods in the form of tractors, devices for places of wor-
ship, village facilities, and infrastructure, the snipers gave them directly 
to the community leaders. The gifts were not free, of course, because 
they came with terms and conditions under which the recipient had to 
choose the candidate funding the activity for pilkades.
In addition to giving money and goods to the voters, the snipers also 
performed a ritual of “sweeping the land” of the dukuh at night. The 
purpose of this ritual was to “lock up” the voters so that the people in 
the area did not vote for other candidates.
The team’s success in influencing voters through money politics was 
opposed by other candidate teams. Figure 1.2 indicates the resistance 
effort to break the influence of money politics and spiritual practices.
Figure 1.2. Fighting money politics and shamans. 
As Figure 1.2 shows, the fight against money politics and shamans was 
carried out by the Titik Istiyawatun Khasanah (TIK) team by first form-
ing a volunteer team that consisted of young people from all villages, 
community leaders, and farmer groups. They were brought together in 
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the volunteer team because of a common vision and mission, namely 
to build an independent and developed village. Second, the volunteer 
team mapped out the snipers in each hamlet who would observe and 
supervise the area to prevent snipers from other success teams from 
engaging in money politics at night. They would wait for the snipers 
to leave the house and visit the villages every night, and then break 
the chain of money politics. This last step was aimed at breaking the 
practice of money politics and the spiritual practices by the shamans. 
When the snipers left the house at midnight, they were immediately 
stalked and arrested by the volunteers. When the snipers were arrested, 
the volunteers found a number of envelopes with millions of rupiahs. 
The money had been prepared to be distributed to the voters at the 
neighborhood community level. If these snipers were captured and in-
terrogated, there would be enough evidence indicating that the other 
candidate was buying people’s votes.
Figure 1.3. Pilkades without money politics and shamans.
In addition, the volunteers also tried to pinpoint which areas had been 
cast a spell on by the shaman. After that, the volunteers would urinate 
on the area to repel the spells cast by the shaman. They believed that 
186 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 5, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2020
by doing so, the spells would be broken and the area would be clean 
again. In short, the volunteers struggled to break the chain of money 
politics and the spells cast by the shaman by capturing the snipers and 
urinating on the suspected areas.
However, are there other ways to win the contest besides practicing 
money politics and shamanism? Did TIK also practice money politics 
and ask for help from shamans to win votes? How could TIK win the 
contest in pilkades without the help of money politics and shamans? 
Figure 1.3. shows pilkades free from money politics and shamans.
Figure 1.3 is based on a research interview with TIK, the elected 
candidate, and her success team. When the author asked TIK about her 
capital and strategies to run for the village head, she said, “I feel guilty 
for not contributing to the Sriharjo community. I have to go home 
to build my village. The capital I use to run for the election is com-
mitment and confidence” (Interview with Titik Istiyawatun Khasanah, 
March 12, 2019). From her answer, the efforts she made to win the 
contest can be described as follows:
The first type of capital she had was confidence and commitment to 
build a more advanced Sriharjo Village. It encouraged TIK as a woman 
to run for the village head. Confidence was quite instrumental for TIK 
because she did not have sufficient financial capital. However, her com-
petitor possessed a lot of financial capital, which allowed money poli-
tics practices to be employed. However, TIK’s confidence capital was 
motivated by the former village head’s case where he was imprisoned 
for acts of corruption and forced to vacate his position. The temporary 
village head could not take any action in regard to policy making, 
village development, and urgent decisions in response to disasters. In 
this case, TIK also saw the right momentum to nominate herself as a 
village-head candidate because at that time there was no one in the vil-
lage to take actions for change. An interviewee said, “The village head’s 
office is only operational for several days a week. Public officers in the 
village do not go to the office every day. Infrastructure development is 
not going well. We need leaders who can bring changes to Sriharjo” 
(Interview with Bambang, March 27, 2019). In summary, the village 
187FIGHTING MONEY POLITICS AND SHAMANIC PRACTICES
government system was in a depressed condition because services to the 
community had not been running for more than three years. One of 
the impacts of nonfunctioning village government services was that Sri-
harjo was left behind compared to other villages, especially in terms of 
community economic empowerment and infrastructure development. 
This momentum, then, further strengthened the confidence of TIK to 
run for the village head.
The second type of capital was social capital. Self-confidence alone 
was not enough; therefore, TIK utilized a family gathering post-Eid 
2018 to build her connections. Joko Supriyanto, a member of TIK’s 
success team, said, “Mbak Titik wants to run for village head, so she 
is using this moment where her big family is here to announce her 
endeavor” (Interview with Joko, March 27, 2019). At the gathering, TIK 
spoke about her intention and desire to nominate herself as the village 
head of Sriharjo. She explained the condition of the village to her 
family, and it turned out that they were very supportive of TIK’s inten-
tion. Her family showed great support, and some even helped with the 
funding for the nomination process. The family then started to build 
a network to back TIK. The support from her family boosted TIK’s 
energy and positivity.
The third type of capital was network capital. After TIK received 
support from her extended family, the next step was to approach ex-
youth cadets. Around 2003–2007, TIK was an active member of a youth 
organization. She said, “The village hall was my home. Every night I 
was at the village hall” (Interview with Titik Istiyawatun Khasanah, 
March 12, 2019). From her statement, it appears that she had been a 
village activist and worked to build the village from a young age. One 
of her friends said, “In the past Mbak Titik once built a flyover and 
collaborated with the Masri Singarimbun Museum” (Interview with 
Suparjiyono, March 27, 2019). It turned out that her friends from the 
Karang Taruna she belonged to were also concerned about Sriharjo’s 
stagnant condition. Upon hearing that TIK would be running for vil-
lage head, they came to her and pledged their support. The positive 
response from TIK’s friends was motivated by three things: (1) TIK 
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had a proven track record of caring for the Sriharjo community, which 
was evidenced by real work, (2) the volunteers made their move to the 
neighborhood community and the hamlets to form a liquid volunteer 
team, and (3) they sincerely volunteered to help TIK win the contest 
without being paid. These volunteers spontaneously formed a team 
whose members could not be detected by other candidates. They called 
themselves a liquid team that blended into the community, without a 
leader, secretary, and treasurer, or a structured success team.
The fourth type of capital was true sedulur (comrades) virus. Be-
cause the bonds among Sriharjo community members were strong, 
social capital was one of the determining factors for TIK’s victory. An 
interviewee said, “We support Mbak Titik with sincerity and without 
money politics in place. We introduced true sedulur as the real sedu-
lur who would always be genuine” (Interview with Bambang, March 
27, 2019). True sedulur became the glue for volunteers, and they were 
committed to never exchanging the bonds they had for the practice of 
money politics. This relation was an actualization of the values upheld 
by their ancestors. With the stagnant state of the Sriharjo government 
system and TIK as a candidate for village head, young people of the 
village were inspired to work hand in hand to build the village.
The last resource was socialization strategies. After family support 
and youth clubs were established, the next step taken by TIK was to 
bring her vision, mission, and programs to surrounding community 
groups. This process was carried out door-to-door or in discussions with 
farmers’ groups, women’s groups, religious leaders, and community 
leaders. For more than two months, TIK intensively conducted this 
socialization process by spreading the truth about Sriharjo’s stagnant 
condition and campaigning for change to advance progress. When TIK 
met with people of the village, some of them asked for three generator 
sets. To that request, TIK replied, “I cannot give anything, but I can do 
anything” (Interview with TIK, March 12, 2019). In every aspect of this 
process, TIK emphasized the importance of citizens’ voices and rejected 
the idea of money politics. “If I give money to you to provide you with 
the things you want and need, later on when I become the village head, 
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I will more likely look for ways to earn back the money I gave to you and 
not think about the progress of the village. Do you not want Sriharjo 
to progress like other villages?” said TIK in an interview on March 12, 
2019. With this process of informing community members about the 
current status of Sriharjo and the building of the village, people began 
to understand what TIK was proposing and started supporting her.
The intensive process of going from house to house within a pe-
riod of two months resulted in three things. The first was a sense of 
togetherness that everyone was in the same boat. The core of TIK’s 
process was the presentation of the stagnant village government and 
her vision, mission, and programs to change Sriharjo for the better. 
This illustrated a sense of shared fate among the community. They 
suffered from the same difficulties because public services were not 
functioning well. The impact of stagnant economic development and 
infrastructure distinguished Sriharjo from neighboring villages, but in a 
negative way. When floods hit Sriharjo in 2017, the village government 
did not quickly respond to help the victims. “The village government 
did not have enough money to help the victims of the flooding. The 
people took the initiative to build a public kitchen to deal with the 
food shortage without the help of the village government” (Interview 
with Joko, March 27, 2019). It was the people of Sriharjo who spontane-
ously helped fellow villagers who became flood victims. It seems that 
the enthusiasm of the youth organization, working together to open 
a public kitchen, was repeated in the process of nominating TIK as 
the village head. The spirit of the people of Sriharjo was sparked as 
a result of their shared experience of malfunctioning public services. 
The second result was public trust. The emergence of TIK in the midst 
of the leadership crisis came as a breath of fresh air to the people of 
Sriharjo. Supported by her track record as a youth activist, TIK did not 
encounter many difficulties in gaining the public trust because she was 
thought to represent new hope to the village to once again progress 
economically like the neighboring villages. Community trust in TIK 
was important in the pilkades contest because without it, she would 
not have won and become the village head. This community trust was 
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transformed in the acquisition of votes for TIK. The last result was her 
rising electability. With the public trust, her electability increased. It 
was easy to predict that TIK would win the contest as she already won 
the people’s trust and achieved high electability. This scheme could be 
seen in every hamlet neighborhood community in the village. In the 
Sriharjo pilkades, which had relatively few voters (6,055 people), elect-
ability mapping could be easily predicted, especially because TIK was 
supported by her liquid volunteer team in each hamlet.
CONCLUSION
Village democracy comes from people’s conscience based on the value 
of deliberation to reach consensus. However, the direct election of the 
village head breaks the culture of the village community. Candidates 
who do not have sufficient capital or goods will lose the village-head 
election.
The results of this study, however, show the opposite, because can-
didates seized power in the Sriharjo pilkades without employing money 
politics and the influence of shamans. The Scott patronage relation 
theory as interpreted by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) as the practice 
of money politics and clientelism with five categories, (1) vote buying, 
(2) personal gifts, (3) services and activities, (4) club goods, and (5) 
pork barrel projects- this is different from what happened in Sriharjo 
village, where they have local wisdom. This means that Aspinall and 
Sukmajati’s money politics cannot be implemented in Sriharjo village. 
Because they are aware and put forward the politics of conscience that 
embodies the maturity of society.
The politics of conscience is the embodiment of community matu-
rity. Even though people live in poverty, they were not easily bribed by 
money or goods in the 2018 Sriharjo pilkades. The politics of conscience 
differs from Scott and Muhtadi’s theories about patronage This finding 
also negates Scott’s (1972) and Muhtadi’s (2013) theories. Scott (1972) 
believes that patronage can exist in an agricultural society and that 
the patronage relation can be used by electoral candidates to get votes. 
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However, Muhtadi (2013) argues that poor communities are vulnerable 
and prone to the practices of money politics.
This political theory of conscience also raises questions different 
from Moedjanto’s (1986) and Anderson’s (1972) theory of kasekten, or 
concrete power. One of the findings of this study shows that the spells 
cast by shamans can be broken by urinating on the area in which spells 
have been cast. Concrete power also encourages candidates running 
for village head not to believe that shamans’ powers can help secure 
people’s votes. The correct way to win votes from the people is by win-
ning their hearts by going door-to-door, spreading the word about the 
vision, missions, and programs proposed by a candidate. In addition, in 
this case the candidate was supported by a team of volunteers (youth 
clubs) who sincerely worked and blended in with the community, which 
left no trace for other competitors to detect.
Because TIK employed the politics of conscience, a sense of unity, 
trust, and electability in the community emerged. With this trust, the 
people of Sriharjo were not able to be bribed with money and goods, 
or controlled by shamans.
SUGGESTIONS
The district government in carrying out the election for village heads 
should pay attention to the sociocultural factors of the community, 
where the rise of money politics is destroying the spirit of solidarity 
and harmony between villagers. In fact, the direct election for village 
head is not a reflection of substantial democracy. Rather, substantial 
democracy will be realized through deliberation to reach consensus, 
values  respecting differences, and togetherness.
Future research on the same topic should employ other methods to 
produce quality and more accurate information.
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